Spurring subsidy entrepreneurs
研究了意大利地方补贴对创新初创企业的影响，发现补贴虽未直接改善企业绩效，但增加了企业获得后续补贴的概率，形成恶性“马太效应”。
In the attempt to boost innovation, policy-makers have enacted a myriad of programs targeting innovative start-ups in recent years. Empirical evidence on these initiatives has almost exclusively focused on national-level programs, overlooking those implemented at the local level. This paper provides the first quasi-experimental evidence on the joint effects of local policies focusing on Italy, where regional governments have been very active in providing financial support to these firms. By leveraging discontinuities in program design, we adopt a local randomization approach and document a null effect of these programs over a wide range of firm-level outcomes. However, we find that securing local subsidies increases start-ups’ probability to obtain additional public subsidies, which points in the direction of a vicious “Matthew effect” in subsidy allocation. Consistent with both reputation and learning mechanisms, the increase in follow-on subsidies occurs for funds disbursed at the local level only, whereas no effect is detected for subsidies allocated by national or international authorities. • We study the effects of local programs for innovative start-ups in Italy. • To identify causal effects, we leverage discontinuities in incentives assignment. • We document a null effect of these programs over a wide range of firm-level outcomes. • Local subsidies increase start-ups’ probability to obtain additional public subsidies, indicating the presence of a vicious “Matthew effect”.