Do Female CEOs Manage Costs Differently? Evidence From Asymmetric Cost Behavior
研究发现女性CEO所在企业的成本非对称性低于男性CEO，尤其在经济下行期、高业务风险、高职业担忧及竞争激烈市场中更明显，表明风险规避和竞争偏好是潜在机制。
This article investigates the gender effect on asymmetric cost behavior. We find that firms with female chief executive officers (CEOs) exhibit less cost asymmetry than firms with male CEOs. This finding holds in a range of robustness tests including those that address omitted variable bias and self-selection bias. Cross-sectional tests show that this gender effect is concentrated in the economic downturn period, firms with higher business risk, CEOs with higher personal career concerns, and firms in more competitive product markets, corroborating that females’ risk aversion and competitive preference are underlying mechanisms through which female CEOs manage costs differently compared to male CEOs. We also find supportive evidence of pessimism as an underlying mechanism. Further analysis shows that female CEOs tend to use more flexible costs to adjust resources in response to sales change.