Manager political preferences and company investor bases
研究发现，共和党倾向的高管因风险规避，会降低杠杆、减少长期投资、提高信息披露质量，从而吸引更多短期机构投资者，尤其在财务压力时期更明显。
Abstract We investigate how the personal political preferences of top managers shape the investor base of firms. Based on the risk‐aversion attitude of firm decisions that rely on conservative political ideologies, we find that Republican managers tend to maintain a lower leverage level; invest less in tangible assets and R&D to pursue near‐term profitability; and maintain a high quality of information disclosure to increase stock liquidity. We demonstrate that firms led by Republican managers can attract more transient institutions. This relationship becomes stronger during financially stressful periods and is robust after considering the moderating role of managerial discretion and potential endogeneity.