The Imitation Game: The Imitation Game: How Encouraging Renegotiation Makes Good Borrowers Bad
研究发现，商业抵押贷款借款人会机会主义地试图获得本金减免；当重新谈判成本降低后，高私人使用价值的借款人更可能转入特殊服务，表明本金减免对贷款人有不利后果。
Abstract We show that commercial mortgage borrowers behave opportunistically to attempt to obtain principal reductions. We develop a model in which lenders cannot perfectly observe borrowers’ use values and renegotiation is costly. We then exploit a tax rule change that reduced the cost of renegotiation. Consistent with the model predictions, borrowers with high private use values of the property are more likely to transfer into special servicing when lenders have a higher capacity to negotiate principal reductions after the rule change. Our results suggest adverse consequences of principal forgiveness for lenders.