Norms and the evolution of leaders' followership
研究了领导者、追随者与大众追随者在局部互动协调博弈中的互动，解释了帕累托占优行为如何在风险占优环境中存活，并回答了如何移除或安置领导者以优化收益。
In this paper, we model the interaction between leaders, their followers and crowd followers in a coordination game with local interaction. The steady states of a dynamic best-response process can feature a coexistence of Pareto-dominant and risk-dominant actions in the population. The existence of leaders and their followers, along with the local interaction, which leads to clustering, is crucial for the survival of the Pareto-dominant actions. The evolution of leader and crowd followership shows that leader followership can also be locally stable around Pareto-dominant leaders. The paper answers the questions of which leader should be removed and how to optimally place leaders in the network to enhance payoff-dominant play.