CEO power and firm risk at the onset of the 2007 financial crisis and the COVID-19 health crisis: international evidence
研究了2007年金融危机和2020年新冠疫情初期，CEO权力与企业风险的关系，发现权力越大的CEO所在企业风险越高，但疫情期间这种关系减弱。
Abstract We investigate the association between CEO power and firm risk at the onset of the global financial crisis in 2007 and the COVID-19 pandemic health crisis in 2020. Examining an international sample of publicly listed firms in the G7 nations between 2006 and 2021, we show that firms led by CEOs with greater power are exposed to higher risk than firms led by CEOs with lesser power. The result is primarily driven by the impact of CEO power on idiosyncratic risk rather than systematic risk. Further, we find that powerful CEOs tend to be more cautious and conservative during crises that they have no reference for or experience of, as in the case of the pandemic, during which the positive power–risk associations are less pronounced. Nevertheless, the power–risk association remains relatively unchanged during the more familiar financial crisis. This study has important implications for firms, investors, regulators, and policymakers.