Capital flow freezes
研究了2008年金融危机后银行危机引发主权危机的机制，发现私人债务集中谈判时，议价能力低导致债务和违约率过低，议价能力高则资本流入冻结，需通过宏观审慎政策征税来应对。
Abstract The period following the 2008 financial crisis focused attention on “twin-crises,” where banking crises precipitate sovereign crises due to increased bank support. We show that when private sector debt is renegotiated centrally, and bargaining power is low, it results in suboptimally low levels of debt and default rates (haircuts). If, instead, the bargaining power is sufficiently high, the supply of debt exceeds its demand and capital inflows “freeze”. These inefficiencies arise because the decentralized borrowers fail to consider how their bond supply impacts debt renegotiation outcomes, affecting both bond prices and the asset span. These issues can be addressed through macroprudential policies in the form of taxing capital inflows.