Capital Investment, Equity Returns, and Aggregate Dynamics in Oligopolistic Production Economies
构建了一个包含资本投资和实际摩擦的寡头垄断部门动态一般均衡模型，分析默契合谋如何影响经济与金融市场的互动，并解释行业集中度与股票收益之间的模糊关系。
Abstract We analyze effects of tacit collusion in a dynamic general equilibrium model of oligopolistic sectors with capital investment and real frictions. Through their effects on equilibrium- and off-equilibrium stock prices, fundamental shocks affect incentives for defection from tacit collusion, amplifying the interaction between the real economy and financial markets as well as firms’ risk exposure. The model implies ambiguous relationship between industry concentration and equity returns depending on operating leverage, which helps reconcile conflicting evidence in the literature. We find quantitative and empirical support for novel theoretical predictions regarding the effects of concentration on returns and investment.