Passive Investment and Share Repurchases
研究发现被动持股比例高的公司回购更多股票，且更可能用回购来达到分析师盈利预测，这种行为会损害公司未来的就业、投资和业绩，表明被动投资可能纵容管理层机会主义行为。
SYNOPSIS We investigate the association between passive investment and share repurchases, both of which are at historically high levels and the subject of increased scrutiny. We first document that firms with more passive ownership exhibit higher levels of repurchase activity. Next, and more importantly, we find that firms with passive ownership conduct more “suspect” repurchases that result in reported earnings that meet or beat analysts’ earnings forecasts, and this effect is more pronounced for firms with performance-based equity compensation incentive plans. We also find that repurchase activity more negatively affects firms’ future employment, capital expenditures, and performance when the firm has more passive owners. We conclude that passive investment is associated with an increase in the quantity and a reduction in the quality of firms’ repurchase activities. Our study provides evidence that passive institutional investment may allow opportunistic management behavior rather than serving the monitoring role traditionally associated with institutional ownership. Data availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: M41; G32; G35.