Conflict and returns to scale in production
研究了生产投入部分不安全时，规模报酬如何影响玩家对资源争夺的努力，发现递增规模报酬下大玩家更可能扩张，递减规模报酬下小玩家冲突更激烈。
We develop a conflict model but rather than output being subject to appropriation, one of the inputs to production is partially insecure. We find that how a player responds to an increase in the secure portion of its resource depends on the returns to scale in production. With increasing (decreasing) returns to scale, an increase in the secure portion of the resource will increase (decrease) that player’s effort to contest the resource. We also show that with increasing (decreasing) returns to scale the player controlling more of the secure resource exerts higher (lower) equilibrium effort in the contest for the unsecure resource. For constant returns to scale, players’ efforts remain unaffected by the amount of secured resources controlled. Our findings imply that territorial expansions by large actors will be more likely observed within the context of production technologies subject to increasing returns to scale (e.g. oil extraction). With decreasing returns to scale (e.g. alluvial diamonds, agricultural land), we predict more intense conflict by small actors.