Competing for Influence in Networks Through Strategic Targeting
通过实验研究对立观点玩家如何在网络中通过战略目标选择争夺影响力，发现玩家多采用基于相对影响力的最佳回应策略，但也存在偏离行为，如倾向选择中心节点和回避对手已选节点。
We experimentally investigate how players with opposing views compete for influence through strategic targeting in networks. We varied the network structure, the relative influence of the opponent, and the heterogeneity of the nodes’initial opinions. Although most players adopted a best-response strategy based on their relative influence, we also observed behaviors deviating from this strategy, such as the tendency to target central nodes and avoid nodes targeted by the opponent. Targeting is also affected by affinity and opposition biases, the strength of which depends on the distribution of initial opinions.