Can you keep a secret? The dissemination of false rumors and the evolution of bubbles in perceived predatory trading games
研究虚假谣言如何影响股票价格泡沫演变，发现其与真实谣言下的泡沫形成显著不同，且泡沫更易崩溃、波动更大，对监管者构成挑战。
This research addresses the impact of fake rumors on the evolution of bubbles in stock prices in a perceived predatory trading game. In line with intuition, we find that the development of these bubbles is significantly different from the formation and progression of bubbles based on true rumors. Particularly, the first increase in stock prices may be followed by a crash when the rumor is not true. More volatility is observed when there are many players or when there is a lot of pressure to act on the victim. In contrast, the dissemination of the rumor has a dampening effect on the inflation of the bubble when the rumor is true. Moreover, it is more difficult to detect false rumors from stock prices when there are many predators. This observation makes herding among predators a particular challenging problem for regulators and policymakers. • Embedding Fake News in Predatory Trading Games. • Modeling Logical Bubbles Arising from Rumors. • Relationship Between Rumor Spread and Price Fluctuations in Financial Markets