Teamwork in Contests
利用Kaggle数据研究动态竞赛中自组织团队的表现与形成机制，发现团队优于个人但形成意愿低，并量化了团队合作对生产力和参与积极性的权衡影响，为竞赛设计提供启示。
Abstract We study self-organized teams in dynamic contests. Using data from Kaggle, we document that teams outperform solo players, but few players choose to form teams. Every new team alters the composition of players, discouraging less productive solo players to make submissions. We estimate the structural parameters of a dynamic contest model, including the team formation and submission costs. We find that team formation incentives diminish with the number of teams, as do the incentives to make submissions. We empirically evaluate the productivity-discouragement tradeoff caused by teamwork and discuss implications for contest design, including facilitating teamwork and hosting open competitions.