Trust in Lending
研究了贷款中信任与声誉的区别，发现银行比非银行机构更受信任，信任能切断业绩与融资成本的联系，但信任易失难复，银行因存款保险和信念修正机制享有信任优势，对存款保险政策有启示。
Abstract We develop a theory of trust in lending that distinguishes between reputation and trust. Banks emerge as more trusted lenders than non-banks. We show that trust severs the link between performance and the cost and availability of financing for lenders, but trust can be lost and is difficult to regain. Banks survive an erosion of trust better than non-banks. Banks' trust advantage arises from the lower cost of funding due to insured deposits and an endogenous belief revision channel that complements the effect of the funding cost advantage. The results have novel policy relevance for deposit insurance scope.