Does public officials' risk preference differ in self versus public decision‐making? It depends on decision framing and bet size
通过中国公共官员的调查实验，发现官员为公众决策时风险偏好低于为自己决策，且这种差异仅在收益框架和大赌注条件下出现，对管理公共决策风险有启示。
Abstract Psychological distance theory and social value theory suggest there is a risk difference in self versus other decision‐making. On this basis, this study explores whether public officials' risk preferences differ in self versus public decision‐making. Inspired by prospect theory, the decision framing and bet size are further considered as the decision‐making conditions. Through a survey experiment using Chinese public officials, this study finds that, compared with decision‐making for themselves, public officials have a lower risk preference in decision‐making for the public. In addition, this risk preference difference occurs under the conditions of a gain frame and larger bet size. Conversely, under the condition of a loss frame and smaller bet size, the risk preference difference disappears. This study reveals public officials' risk pattern in self versus public decision‐making, which has significant implications for managing risk in public decision‐making and guiding those officials to make better decisions for the public.