A Simple Theory of Deep Trade Integration
构建了一个不完全竞争贸易模型，分析技术差异和监管偏好差异如何影响国家间的监管合作深度，发现监管偏好差异适中的国家最适合合作，而强比较优势国家可通过相互让步实现更深合作。
Abstract Which countries should aim for regulatory cooperation, and to what extent should they pursue it? We develop an imperfectly competitive trade model that accounts for differences in technology and regulatory preferences regarding local consumption externalities across countries. Each country sets unique product standards, and firms incur costs when tailoring products to different markets. Trade occurs when the benefits of comparative advantages outweigh the desire for asymmetric regulations. Our findings indicate that regulatory cooperation, defined as the cooperative setting of standards, is most advantageous for countries with moderate differences in regulatory preferences. Shallow integration, however, falls short of achieving the optimal planner’s solution. Countries with strong comparative advantages in distinct externality-generating goods can pursue deeper regulatory cooperation through mutual regulatory concessions. Additionally, when regulatory preferences are highly dispersed, international cooperation tends to form regulatory blocs.