Employee Representation and the Manager-to-Worker Pay Ratio
研究了员工董事会代表参与决定管理层薪酬如何影响公司内部薪酬比率，发现2009年德国薪酬法案增强了员工影响力，导致经理与工人薪酬比率上升，主要源于管理层薪酬提高，而公司绩效或经理离职率未变。
Abstract We study how involving employee board representatives in determining managerial compensation affects the within-firm pay ratio. The 2009 German Compensation Act shifted executive pay decisions to the entire supervisory board, amplifying employees’ influence at firms with parity employee representation. This reform resulted in increased manager-to-worker pay ratios, driven by higher managerial compensation, without corresponding changes in firm performance or manager turnover. The result is robust in matched samples and absent in falsification tests. Improved employee job security and weak wage increases point to a possible alliance between employees and managers, indicating shared governance may not necessarily reduce pay inequality.