Optimal taxation under status consumption and preferences for equality
分析了当部分人具有地位消费偏好且同时存在相对消费关注与平等偏好时，最优税收结构如何设计，发现激励相容导致累退边际税率，有地位偏好者税率更低。
Abstract This article analyses optimal taxation when (1) a fraction of people has positional preferences, and (2) concerns for relative consumption and preferences for equality are operative simultaneously. We show that incentive compatibility motivates a regressive marginal tax structure, which in the end implies that people with positional preferences are taxed at a lower marginal rate than people without such preferences. A counteracting mechanism arises if those who are not concerned with their relative consumption have preferences for income-equality, even if people with positional preferences should still be taxed at a lower marginal rate than motivated by their contributions to externalities.