Monitoring in Small Firms: Experimental Evidence from Kenyan Public Transit
通过在肯尼亚小巴上安装监控设备并随机让车主访问数据，研究发现监控使车主调整合同条款，激励司机更努力并减少冒险，从而降低成本、提高利润，部分企业还有扩张迹象。
Small firms struggle to grow beyond a few employees. We introduce monitoring devices into commuter minibuses in Kenya and randomize which minibus owners have access to the data using a novel mobile app. We find that treated vehicle owners modify the terms of the contract to induce higher effort and lower risk taking from their drivers. This reduces firm costs and increases firm profitability. There is suggestive evidence that some firms expand. These results suggest that small firms may be able to utilize monitoring technologies to overcome problems of moral hazard and enhance their profitability.