Dynamic Outside Options and Optimal Negotiation Strategies
研究了当代理人的外部选择随时间变化时，委托人与代理人如何分割利益，发现委托人最优策略是逐步让利并减少时间压力，且外部选择的漂移和波动反而提升委托人收益。
We study the design of negotiation strategies when a principal and agent must decide how to split a pie while the agent's outside option changes over time. The principal's optimal strategy under commitment demonstrates a new, but intuitive, set of negotiation dynamics. When the agent is tempted to leave, the principal gradually promises a larger share (decreasing demands) and more time to explore the outside option (decreasing pressure), illustrating a complementarity between these two tools. Although the principal's expected utility is decreasing in the outside option, his expected utility and demands are increasing in the outside option's drift and volatility.