Syndicated Lending, Competition, and Relative Performance Evaluation
研究发现，相对绩效评估合同使银行不愿参与被其列为竞争对手的银行承销的贷款，导致牵头行持有更大份额、借款人获得更少贷款且利率更高，揭示了竞争与合作在银团贷款中的矛盾。
Abstract Relative performance evaluation (RPE) intensifies competitive pressure by tying executive compensation to the profits of rivals. We show that these contracts make loan syndication harder by reducing banks’ willingness to participate in loans underwritten by banks named in their RPE contracts. Lead arranger banks, which are more frequently named in RPE, hold larger shares of the loans they syndicate, and their borrowers receive smaller and fewer loans and face higher spreads. Our results highlight the tension between the normal benefits of competition versus the need for cooperation in loan syndication.