公平、中立且高效的投票规则

Equitable, neutral, and efficient voting rules

Journal of Mathematical Economics · 2024
被引 3
人大 A-ABS 3

中文导读

Moulin(1980)发现匿名性、中立性和效率在投票中往往不可兼得,除非接受平局。本文证明,即使将匿名性弱化为Bartholdi等人(2021)提出的公平性,这种不相容性依然存在,表明公平与效率之间的冲突比以往认知更深。

Abstract

In the context of voting, Moulin (1980) establishes that anonymity, neutrality, and efficiency are often incompatible unless one accepts indecision (i.e. ties). We show that versions of this incompatibility continue to hold for a natural weakening of anonymity proposed by Bartholdi et al. (2021) called equity . As equity is a relatively weak fairness requirement, the tension between fairness and efficiency in voting is deeper than previously established.

投票规则公平性中立性效率