Regulatory offsetting in advanced democracies
研究了OECD国家如何通过“监管抵消”机制（每引入一项新规就废除一项旧规）来应对规则膨胀，发现政治和观念因素影响是否采用该机制，但不决定其具体设计。
Abstract The growth of rules in modern democracies burdens citizens, businesses, and administrative bodies. To address this, many governments have implemented so‐called “regulatory offsetting schemes,” requiring the removal of existing rules and regulations for each new one introduced. However, systematic knowledge on which countries have adopted these schemes and their specific designs remains lacking. Our study maps regulatory offsetting initiatives across OECD states and offers a first theoretical framework for understanding government adoption. While political and ideational factors influence the adoption of offsetting schemes, they do not explain their specific design. Offsetting schemes thus reflect the political tensions between advocates for an activist state and supporters of a more restrained government, with design being of secondary importance. These findings enhance our understanding of how governments and public administrations manage rule growth.