Labor Market Effects of Workweek Restrictions: Evidence from the Great Depression
研究了1933年《总统再就业协议》和《国家工业复兴法》对每周工时的限制，发现限制实施后就业率上升约24%，但工时较长的行业时薪增长更快，周薪却相对下降。
We study the effects of restrictions on the length of the workweek under the President’s Reemployment Agreement (PRA) of July 1933 and the National Industrial Recovery Act. We construct a model in which the equilibrium without such a workweek restriction has an inefficiently low level of employment. We find that employment rose by about 24 percent in the month following the imposition of the workweek restriction. Industries with longer workweeks pre-PRA experienced 9.4 percent faster growth in hourly earnings post-PRA, but this increase was not sufficient to prevent a relative fall in weekly earnings in these industries.