Automation, Bargaining Power, and Labor Market Fluctuations
提出自动化威胁会削弱工人在工资谈判中的议价能力，导致工资调整缓慢并放大失业波动，通过包含自动化决策的商业周期模型解释了失业和职位空缺相对于工资的高波动性。
We argue that the threat of automation weakens workers’ bargaining power in wage negotiations, dampening wage adjustments and amplifying unemployment fluctuations. We make this argument based on a business cycle model with labor market search frictions, generalized to incorporate automation decisions. In the model, procyclical automation threats create endogenous real wage rigidity that amplifies labor market fluctuations. The automation mechanism is consistent with empirical evidence. It is also quantitatively important for explaining the large volatilities of unemployment and vacancies relative to that of real wages, a puzzling observation through the lens of standard business cycle models.