Pollution for promotion
研究1993-2010年中国省级官员与中央关键人物的关系如何影响污染排放，发现关系越强污染越重，尤其在依赖火电替代水电时更明显，对理解政治激励与环境治理的关系有参考价值。
Abstract This article provides evidence on the impact of political incentives on the environment using the case of China’s pollution during 1993–2010. Exploring variation in governors’ connections with key officials in the center, I document that gaining connections increases pollution (measured by satellite and official data). I also find that connected governors increase coal-fired power production more when less precipitation makes it more difficult to rely on hydropower. These results highlight the importance that career incentives play in influencing environmental outcomes, and they propose a potential pathway for mitigating environmental challenges through the recalibration of political incentives..