Employer cooperation, productivity and wages: new evidence from inter‐firm formal network agreements
利用意大利2008-2018年雇主-雇员匹配数据，研究发现企业间正式网络协议显著提升企业绩效，但工人工资平均略有下降，原因在于工人议价能力减弱。
Abstract Using uniquely rich administrative matched employer–employee data for Italy from 2008 to 2018, we investigate the impact of firms' formal network agreements (FNAs) on firm performance and employee wages. We find an overall significant and economically relevant positive effect of FNAs on various measures of firm performance, but there are no tangible benefits for the workers, and wages decrease slightly, on average. There is, however, marked heterogeneity in the impact on both firms and workers. Estimated rent‐sharing equations, as well as other tests that exploit unionization data, suggest that the negative effects on wages can be explained by a decrease in workers' bargaining power following the introduction of FNAs.