Food and fraud: On the Codfather and harvest mislabeling
研究多物种渔业中企业通过错误报告渔获物种来节省配额成本的动机，利用新英格兰底层鱼类渔业数据，通过潜在类别特征价格方程识别合规与非合规企业，并估计多产出技术以揭示替代可能性差异。
Abstract We study incentives to mislabel output in multispecies fisheries managed by tradeable catch shares. Firms can save quota costs by misreporting species harvested, as seen in criminal proceedings against the Codfather . We show that price elasticities for the abundant species reported in the cheating will be higher for compliant than non‐compliant firms. Using data from the New England groundfish fishery, we test this prediction using a latent class hedonic price equation to identify compliant versus non‐compliant firms. We then estimate multi‐output technologies for compliant and noncompliant firms to identify differences in substitution possibilities. Our empirical results align with theoretical expectations and are robust to placebo tests.