Does Regulation Only Bite the Less Profitable? Evidence from the Too‐Big‐To‐Fail Reforms
研究银行对资本附加费改革的反应，发现利润较低的银行在面临更高要求时会收缩，而利润较高的银行继续扩张，这提高了效率但增加了集中度和尾部风险。
Abstract What shapes banks' response to capital requirement reforms? While prereform capitalization is important in the short term, we posit that profitability is key in the medium term, as it underpins banks' capacity to build capital. We examine the impact of capital surcharges on systemically important banks. Through a novel application of textual analysis to identify when banks react, we show that less profitable banks contract when faced with higher requirements, especially if they are closer to the thresholds that determine their surcharges. Conversely, more profitable banks continue to expand, improving banking efficiency but raising concerns about concentration and exposure to tail risks.