Deposit Competition and Mortgage Securitization
研究发现美国各州取消存款市场上限导致存款竞争加剧，使银行抵押贷款证券化概率提高7.1个百分点，揭示了监管意外推动银行采用发起分销模式。
Abstract We study how deposit competition affects a bank's decision to securitize mortgages. Exploiting the state‐specific removal of deposit market caps across the U.S. as a source of competition, we find a 7.1 percentage point increase in the probability that banks securitize mortgage loans. This result is driven by an 11 basis point increase in deposit costs and corresponding reductions in banks' deposit holdings. Our results are strongest among banks that rely more on deposit funding. These findings highlight a hitherto undocumented and unintended regulatory cause that motivates banks to adopt the originate‐to‐distribute model.