Nudging for Tax Compliance: A Meta-Analysis
通过元分析方法综合了助推实验文献，发现简单提醒、税收道德和威慑助推分别使纳税遵从概率提高2.7、1.4和3.2个百分点，并揭示了助推有效性的条件。
Abstract Governments increasingly use nudges to improve tax collection. We synthesise the growing literature on nudging experiments using meta-analytical methods. We find that, relative to the baseline where about a quarter of taxpayers are compliant, simple reminders increase the probability of compliance by 2.7 percentage points, while tax morale and deterrence nudges increase compliance by an additional 1.4 and 3.2 percentage points. Our further results highlight the conditions where nudges are more or less effective. Overall, our findings imply that taxpayers are biased by various informational and behavioural constraints, and that nudges can be of some help in overcoming these frictions.