Ignorance Is Bliss: The Screening Effect of (Noisy) Information
研究了企业内信息精度对经理人筛选和投资决策的双重影响，发现信息质量与企业价值呈非单调关系，对理解会计信息作用有启示。
ABSTRACT This paper studies the value of a firm’s internal information when the firm faces an adverse selection problem arising from unobservable managerial abilities. Although more precise information allows the firm to make ex post more efficient investment decisions, noisier information has an ex ante screening effect that allows the firm to attract on-average better managers. The tradeoff between more effective screening of managers and more informed investment implies a nonmonotonic relationship between firm value and information quality. A marginal improvement in information quality does not necessarily lead to an overall improvement in firm value. JEL Classifications: M41; D82; G34.