Score Disclosure
研究了当产品有多个质量属性时，卖家可验证的披露行为，发现卖家在某些情况下只披露平均分数而不透露其他信息，这种部分披露均衡在事前和事后利润上都优于完全披露。
Abstract We study verifiable disclosure by a seller when the product has multiple quality attributes. We identify an equilibrium in which, for some qualities, the seller discloses its score—the average of the qualities—and does not reveal anything else. This occurs when its score is sufficiently high or when the qualities are sufficiently similar and the score is not too low. Otherwise, the seller fully discloses. While full unravelling is still an equilibrium, it is dominated by this partial score disclosure equilibrium in terms of ex ante as well as ex post profits.