Competition for publication-based rewards
研究了研究者之间为获得出版奖励而竞争如何影响出版过程质量，发现竞争能减少无信息操纵和过度实验，从而提升质量。
This paper studies how more competition among researchers for publication-based rewards affects the quality of the publication process. Publishable results can be generated via costly informative sequential private experimentation or costly uninformative manipulation. By reducing expected rewards, competition may discourage manipulation in favor of experimentation, but not vice versa. It also reduces excessive experimentation. Both effects improve the quality of the publication process. • Competition affects incentives to engage in different forms of scientific misconduct. • More competition discourages uninformative manipulation in favor of experimentation. • More competition reduces excessive private experimentation. • Competitive pressure can improve the quality of the publication process.