Penalties imposed on board chairs and corporate innovation: evidence from China
研究中国上市公司董事长受处罚后企业创新的变化，发现处罚导致创新减少，尤其在资源冗余少、媒体关注高、行业竞争激烈和非国有企业中更明显。
While previous literature has explored the role of board chairs in firm performance, little is known about how penalties imposed on board chairs shape firms’ strategic decisions and their risk attitude. This study investigates the impact of penalties imposed on board chairs on corporate innovation. Drawing upon the reputation repair and resource dependence perspectives, we present two competing hypotheses that provide distinct insights into how penalties imposed on board chairs influence corporate innovation. Employing a comprehensive dataset of Chinese listed firms, we find that penalties imposed on board chairs lead to a decline in corporate innovation, supporting the resource dependence hypothesis. Further analysis find that this effect is more pronounced in firms with low redundant resources, high media attention, high industry competition, and those are non-state-owned. Our findings contribute to the growing body of the literature on board chairs, innovation and regulatory penalties by exploring the impact of penalties against board chairs on corporate innovation.