Export policy cooperation in a pandemic: the good, the bad and the hopeful
研究了疫情期间发达国家疫苗生产商向发展中国家供应疫苗时，出口国合作政策对全球福利的影响，发现外部性低时合作不如不干预，外部性高时合作优于非合作补贴。
Abstract We develop a model in which vaccine‐producing firms from different developed countries supply vaccines to the developing world during a pandemic. Exporting countries experience a negative externality from incomplete global vaccination, which they try to mitigate by exporting vaccines to developing countries. A cooperative export policy is compared to the alternative regimes of non‐cooperation and non‐intervention. When the negative externality is low, cooperation among exporting countries is worse for global welfare than non‐intervention. However, at high externality levels, export policy cooperation is globally superior to non‐cooperative export subsidization. It then even has the potential to maximize global welfare.