Asymmetries in federal reserve objectives
利用美联储公开市场委员会的经济预测摘要数据，发现美国货币政策制定者对失业和通胀的偏好并非对称，超调与欠调的成本收益不同，这种非对称性自大衰退以来显著影响了政策选择。
Abstract This paper uses evidence from the Federal Open Market Committee’s Summary of Economic Projections to show that US monetary policymakers have objectives over unemployment and inflation outcomes that are not well approximated through a conventional quadratic loss function. Rather, policymakers derive material costs (benefits) from overshooting (undershooting) their long-run inflation and unemployment goals. The trade-off between the resultant downward tilts in unemployment and inflation played a key role in shaping the evolution of monetary policy choices since the Great Recession.