Optimal timing of policy interventions in troubled banks
研究政策当局在不确定银行偿付能力时，如何权衡延迟处置以获取信息与债权人挤兑成本，确定最优处置日期和流动性支持时机。
When will a policy authority (PA) resolve a bank whose solvency is uncertain? Delaying resolution gives the PA time to obtain information about the bank’s solvency. Delaying resolution also gives creditors time to withdraw funds, raising the cost of bailing out depositors. The optimal resolution date trades off these costs with the option value of making a more efficient resolution decision given new information. Providing liquidity support buys the PA time to wait for information, but increases its losses if the bank turns out to be insolvent. The PA may therefore optimally delay the provision of liquidity support.