Utility Tokens as a Commitment to Competition
研究了效用代币如何限制具有市场势力的双边平台的寻租行为，同时保留网络效应带来的效率提升，表明代币化能促使平台放弃垄断租金并实现长期竞争价格。
ABSTRACT We show that utility tokens can limit the rent‐seeking activities of two‐sided platforms with market power while preserving efficiency gains due to network effects. We model platforms where buyers and sellers can meet to exchange services. Tokens serve as the sole medium of exchange on a platform and can be traded in a secondary market. Tokenizing a platform commits a firm to give up monopolistic rents associated with the control of the platform, leading to long‐run competitive prices. We show how the threat of entrants can incentivize developers to tokenize and discuss cases where regulation is needed to enforce tokenization.