Does Stakeholder Outrage Determine Executive Pay?
研究发现，疫情期间宣布CEO减薪的公司实际上通过增加不透明薪酬成分来重构薪酬，这符合管理层权力理论，即利益相关者的愤怒促使薪酬伪装以规避审查。
Abstract An unprecedented number of firms announced CEO salary reductions at the onset of the coronavirus pandemic. We document that the total compensation for these CEOs did not actually decrease but was instead restructured, leading to a marked increase in opaque components of compensation. These adjustments align with the managerial power view of executive pay setting, whereby heightened stakeholder outrage prompts greater camouflaging of compensation to avoid scrutiny. We further show that this pattern of compensation adjustments predominantly occurred in firms with powerful CEOs, weak institutional investor monitoring, and poorer governance quality.