IDEAL DEFAULT FOR RESOLVING DISPUTES EFFICIENTLY
研究了争议双方偏好单峰且私人信息不对称时的仲裁机制，发现高效解决争议的理想默认结果应最大化最难说服参与方的保留收益，与传统观点相反。
Abstract We study arbitration mechanisms where two parties to the dispute have single‐peaked preferences over outcomes, represented by concave utility functions. The most preferred outcome of each party is her private information. By participating in an arbitration mechanism, the parties forfeit the default outcome, which is set without consideration of private preferences. We show that the ideal default outcome for efficient dispute resolution maximizes the sum of the reservation payoffs of the most difficult agent types to persuade to participate in the mechanism. This result is contrary to the conventional wisdom that an unattractive default could force the parties to agree.