Market discipline and government guarantees: Evidence from the insurance industry
利用美国各州对财产责任保险公司义务的担保差异，研究发现担保基金对整体融资风险敏感度影响不大，但在A.M. Best A−评级关键阈值处，评级下调后未受担保业务保费增长显著低于受担保业务，商业保险公司差异高达14.9%。
Abstract We identify the effect of public guarantees on market discipline by exploiting the variation in US state guarantees of property–casualty insurer obligations. We find that guaranty funds have little effect on the risk‐sensitivity of insurer financing overall, with the exception of rating changes at the key threshold level of A.M. Best's A− rating. For insurers rated A− before a downgrade, we find that premium growth in business not covered by state guarantees falls in relation to growth in business covered by state guarantees. We estimate this difference in growth to be as high as 14.9% for commercial insurers.