Managerial incentives and earnings management: Insights from union certification elections
利用工会认证选举的断点回归设计，发现险胜企业通过膨胀酌量性费用（尤其是研发支出）压低盈余，以增强与工人的谈判地位，且该操纵与管理层财务激励、职业动机和固守程度一致。
Abstract This study examines how unionization affects firms' financial reporting. Using a regression discontinuity design, we compare practices of firms narrowly winning and losing union certification elections. We find that winning firms depress earnings significantly more by inflating discretionary expenses, particularly research and development expenses, to strengthen their bargaining positions with workers. We further show that this manipulation aligns with managers' financial incentives, career motives, and entrenchment levels. The paper highlights managers' strategic use of real earnings management in worker negotiations and provides causal evidence on how the dynamic relationships among managers, shareholders, and workers shapes firms' financial reporting.