In pursuit of power: Land tenancy contracts and local political business cycles in Indonesia
研究印度尼西亚村庄中，村长是否利用其有权使用的村有土地（bengkok土地）的租赁合同来巩固政治权力，发现分成租佃合同的比例与选举时间接近程度正相关，表明存在政治俘获。
This study examines whether strategic delegation of land tenancy contracts is linked to local-level political business cycles in the context of a village institution – bengkok land – prevalent since the Dutch colonial rule in Indonesia. Bengkok land refers to communal village land that incumbent village heads receive usufruct rights over until their term in the office ends. We test whether incumbent village heads utilize time-bound access to bengkok land for political consolidation. Based on a novel cross-sectional household survey fielded in 2018 across 130 Javanese villages, we find robust evidence of a positive correlation between the percentage of total tenancy contracts as sharecropping and proximity (before or after) to the village election. As vulnerability of the sharecroppers makes them a pro-poor target for the incumbent village heads, these results implicate political capture.