Toxic Chief Executive Officers; Environmental, Social, and Governance Institutional Investors as Watchdogs; and the Labor Market Outcomes
研究发现，公司环境违规后，CEO的劳动力市场机会减少，被解雇可能性增加，股东支持度下降，且社会责任投资机构发挥了监督作用。
I examine changes in chief executive officer (CEO) labor market outcomes following corporate environmental failures. CEOs of firms subject to Environmental Protection Agency enforcements experience a decline in labor market opportunities as outside directors and a higher likelihood of dismissal as CEOs. They also receive less shareholder support in directorial elections. These effects are mostly visible in recent years and in firms with significant socially responsible investments (SRIs), and they are robust to using state environmental regulations for identification. Shareholders exhibit particular concern over environmental violations that may subject firms to future legal liabilities. Overall, these results point to significant reputational repercussions of environmental failures to CEOs and the disciplinary role of SRIs. This paper was accepted by Camelia Kuhnen, finance. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.02372 .