Share pledging and corporate misconduct
研究发现控股股东股权质押与企业违规可能性显著正相关，且该关系在区分违规类型和处罚力度后依然稳健，主要动机包括缓解融资约束、抬高股价、避免追加保证金及治理不善下的利益侵占。
We investigate and find a significant and positive relation between share pledging by controlling shareholders and the likelihood of corporate misconduct. The results remain robust after classifying misconduct into accounting and non-accounting misconduct, and misconduct receiving severe and light penalties. Alleviation of financial constraints, inflation of stock prices, mitigation of margin calls, and expropriation under poor corporate governance are the main motives for corporate misconduct by firms with pledging controlling shareholders. The positive relation between share pledging and corporate misconduct propensity remains after accounting for endogeneity issues, political connections, intensified bank monitoring, and share repurchasers.