Investor Sentiment, Managerial Manipulation, and Stock Returns
研究发现盈余操纵与股票收益的正向关系主要出现在高情绪时期，并构建博弈模型解释这一现象，提醒市场繁荣期应加强公司报告审查。
Abstract The degree of earnings manipulation has been shown to be positively associated with stock returns at the aggregate level but negatively so in the cross‐ section. We examine, both theoretically and empirically, the role of investor sentiment in accounting for such relations. We find that these patterns are primarily driven by high‐sentiment periods. Embedding investor sentiment into a game‐theoretic model of earnings manipulation with a continuum of firms delivers consistent predictions. Our analysis highlights the importance of increased scrutiny of corporate reporting during market booms, when manipulation is widespread and adds fuel to price exuberance.