Comply or Explain: Do Firms Opportunistically Claim Trade Secrets in Mandatory Environmental Disclosure Programs?
研究页岩气行业企业在强制性化学品披露项目中是否利用商业秘密豁免规则机会主义地隐瞒信息，发现靠近水质监测点的运营商更少主张商业秘密，尤其是上市公司。
ABSTRACT This paper studies whether firms opportunistically make proprietary claims in mandatory environmental disclosure programs with trade secret exemption rules. Examining the mandatory chemical disclosure program in the fracking industry, I find evidence of opportunistic withholding of information among operators that are less likely to have trade secrets. Specifically, I find that these operators claim fewer chemicals as trade secrets when the operating site is in close proximity to water quality monitors. This is only observed among publicly traded operators that face a higher cost of societal backlash when disclosing pollutant information. Further analyses suggest that these operators are concerned about external environmental monitoring, which deters them from opportunistic information withholding. Regarding public and private operators that are more likely to have trade secrets, I do not find strong evidence that their information withholding varies with the monitoring conditions.