Sponsor Reputation and Capital Structure Dynamics in Leveraged Buyouts
研究了杠杆收购中赞助商作为借款人的声誉如何影响其投资组合公司的再融资条件，发现近期退出失败比例越高，股息发放减少、融资成本上升，且该效应在经济繁荣期更明显。
We examine whether leveraged buyout (LBO) sponsors’ reputations as borrowers affect the refinancing terms of their portfolio companies. In 510 U.S. LBOs for which we can reconstruct debt financing activity, 67% of financing events occur one quarter before the earliest existing debt maturity. These On Time events generally improve borrowing terms, whereas Early events feature more dividends, leverage, and higher cost. In each case, dividend issuance decreases and cost increases with the proportion of the sponsors’ recent exits that are failures. Effects are absent for matched firms and prior to the LBO and are procyclical; sponsors with recent failures miss opportunities to decrease financing costs in good times. This paper was accepted by Bo Becker, finance. Supplemental Material: The data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.00971 .