Time‐Consistent Individuals, Time‐Inconsistent Households
研究了多成员家庭中消费与储蓄的模型，发现即使成员有标准指数时间偏好，家庭整体仍会因利他主义不足而储蓄过少、私人消费过多，且共享财富时风险分担收益可能超过过度消费的效用成本。
ABSTRACT I present a model of consumption and savings for a multiperson household in which members are imperfectly altruistic, derive utility from both private and shared public goods, and share wealth. I show that, despite having standard exponential time preferences, the household is time‐inconsistent: Members save too little and overspend on private consumption goods. The household remains time‐inconsistent even when members save separately, because the possibility of voluntary transfers or joint contribution to the public good preserves the dynamic commons problem. The household will choose to share wealth when the risk‐sharing benefits outweigh the utility cost of overconsumption.